In , a huge explosion ripped apart a chemical plant in to confirm that the disaster at the Nypro plant at Flixborough was the result of. Failure Knowledge Database / Selected Cases. 1. Disaster of Chemical Plant at Flixborough. June 1st. , Flixborough UK. TAKEGAWA. Flixborough chemical plant explosion marked with service The disaster at Nypro chemical plant, near Scunthorpe, Lincolnshire, left

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The Flixborough disaster was an flixborougn at a chemical plant close to the village of FlixboroughNorth LincolnshireEngland on Saturday, 1 June Twenty-eight workers were killed and a further 36 suffered injuries.

We had a contract with a Hamburg firm and, if my aged memory serves me correctly, we were bringing in 30, tonnes a week in small coasters. Retrieved 8 July But before we do so we should ask if a lamb might do.

The inch bypass was therefore clearly not what would have been produced or accepted by a more considered process, but controversy developed and became acrimonious as to whether its failure was the initiating fault in the disaster the inch hypothesis, argued by the plant designers DSM and the plant constructors; and favoured by the court’s technical advisers [3]or had dksaster triggered by an external explosion resulting from a previous failure of the 8-inch line argued by experts retained by Nypro and their insurers [3].

You can 194 our cookie privacy page for more information. Ten years after the tragedy the people of Flixborough stood in the churchyard and remembered the men who had been lost. Entertainment Pigs to party once more as rock band make sentimental comeback at pub where they made their debut. Prior to the explosion, on 27 Marchit was discovered that a vertical crack in reactor No.

Flixborough (Nypro UK) Explosion 1st June 1974

My grandfather in Grimsby heard the explosion and thought it was very strange thunder. I was a young child at the time and remember the veil of tragedy that fell over that part of Lincolnshire.

Cast in bronzeit showed mallards alighting on water. When the bypass was installed, there was no works engineer in post and company senior personnel all chemical engineers were incapable of recognising the existence of a simple engineering problem, let alone solving it.

And at flixbkrough special service the Rev Peter Hearn spoke about a memorial — of mallards returning to peaceful waters — which would always be in Flixborough as a reminder. For most ‘notifiable installations’ no further explicit controls should be needed; HSE flixnorough advise and if need be enforce improvements under the general powers given it by the Health and Safety at Work Act HASAWAbut for a very few sites explicit licensing by HSE might be appropriate; [y] responsibility for safety of the installation remaining however always and totally with the licensee.


A memorial to those who diaster was erected in front of offices at the rebuilt site in Thu 5 Jun at 5: Neither when they were first built, nor now that they are in operation, has any local or government agency exercised effective control over their safety.


Flixborough chemical plant explosion marked with service – BBC News

We believe that the best practices must be followed by all companies and that we have reached a state of technological development where it is not sufficient in areas of disastwr risk for employers merely to demonstrate to themselves that all is well. Critics felt that the Flixborough explosion was not the result of multiple basic engineering design errors unlikely to coincide again; the errors were rather multiple instances of one underlying cause: The site today is home to the Flixborough Industrial Estate, occupied by various businesses and Glanford Power Station.

Retrieved 1 July At Flixborough, 28 workers were killed and 36 others onsite suffered injuries. If the bellows were ‘stiff’ resistant to squirmthe shock loading could cause the bellows to tear at pressures below the safety valve setting; it was not impossible that this could occur at pressures experienced during start-up, when pressure was less tightly controlled.

Disasters on the scale of last Saturday’s tragic explosion Immediately after the accident, New Scientist commented presciently on the normal official response to such events, but hoped that the opportunity would be taken to introduce effective government regulation of hazardous process plants. It was disasrer that the number of casualties would have been even higher had the incident occurred on a weekday.

Science matters: Flixborough

People Campaign for more accessible disabled toilets gathers pace as petition is presented to Parliament. On returning home to Goole I was called in for duty and with other officers carried out anti fliixborough patrols through the night. No calculations were done to ascertain whether the bellows or pipe would withstand these strains; no reference was made to the relevant British Standard, or any other accepted standard; no reference was made to the designer’s guide issued by the manufacturers of the bellows; no drawing of the pipe was made, other than in chalk on the workshop floor; no pressure testing either of the pipe or the complete assembly was made before it was fitted.


The cyclohexane oxidation process is still operated in much the same plant design in the Far East. We will not be able to respond to personal family history research questions on this platform. The foundations of properties severely damaged by the blast and subsequently demolished can be found on land between the estate and the village, on the route disaxter as Stather Road.

Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Fortunately, I had a technical report about Flixborough in a personal file I kept in the event of such crises.

Since the accident took place at a weekend there were relatively few people on site: The inquiry report took the view that explosions frequently throw debris in unexpected directions and eyewitnesses often have confused recollections.

Learning from Accidents, 3rd edition.

The plant was subsequently shutdown for an investigation. Only the plant engineer was concerned about restarting before the reason for the failure was understood, and the other reactors inspected.

HSE could then choose to — in some cases generally involving high risk or novel technology — require [x] submission of a more elaborate assessment, covering as appropriate “design, manufacture, construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance, as well as subsequent modifications whether of the design or operational procedures or both”.

The 8-inch hypothesis was claimed to be supported by eyewitness accounts and by the apparently anomalous position of some debris post-disaster. No drawing of the proposed modification was produced.

Flixborough 1974 chemical plant explosion marked with service

Fires continued on-site for more than ten days. For major modifications this would include an ‘operability study’ ; for minor modifications a checklist-based safety assessment was to be used, indicating what aspects would be affected, and for each aspect giving a statement of the expected effect.

Five years later, when former EEC Commissioner Stanley Clinton Davis unveiled a plaque at the site to mark the completion of infrastructure works, there were already hundreds of new jobs on the estate. Property in the surrounding area was damaged to a varying degree. In view of the Court of Inquiry’s qualified conclusion, the cause of the accident has been the subject of considerable controversy, especially as to the actual failure process e.

There are now probably more than a dozen British petrochemical plants with a similar devastation-potential to the Nypro works at Flixborough.

Significant overpressures could be developed where the release was large, and ignition delayed: